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My son is autistic, and our family has spent a long time waiting for the Ontario Autism Program. Waiting teaches you to ask a simple question: what decides who gets help, and when?
The answer should be boring. It should be the program’s published rules, applied the same way to everyone. It should never be who you know, who you vote for, or what you could do for a party.
The principle
Public care comes with no political debt. A family that gets a public service owes no one a campaign, a donation, volunteer hours or its silence.
Volunteering for a party is a normal part of democracy. People should do it freely, for any party they like. What should never happen is a public service that depends on it. That line is easy to state, and it should be stated by the government that runs the services.
Every family deserves a public answer
Ontario’s rules say children and youth are invited into the Ontario Autism Program’s core clinical services in registration order. Those rules are public, and that is good.
A rule on paper only helps if a family can find out where they stand under it. That means plain information, a named office that answers, a time limit for answering, and a way to challenge a mistake.
Public money requires public reasons
This is not only about autism services. Ontario’s Auditor General has reported on how other public decisions were made. The three reports below are about separate programs. They make no finding about the Ontario Autism Program, and we draw none. They show why published criteria and written reasons matter.
What the Auditor General found, and what happened next
| Report | What the Auditor General found | What happened next |
|---|---|---|
| Changes to the Greenbelt (special report, 2023) | In a special report, the Auditor General found that the way the government assessed and selected lands for removal from the Greenbelt “was not publicly transparent, objective or well-informed,” and that “direct access to the Housing Minister’s Chief of Staff resulted in certain prominent developers receiving preferential treatment.” Owners of the 15 land sites removed could ultimately see a collective $8.3 billion increase in the value of their properties. | In its follow-up on the 2023 Greenbelt special report, the Auditor General found that, as of August 20, 2025, the Province had fully implemented 95% (21 of 22) of the recommended actions, including re-evaluating the 2022 boundary decision, which was reversed. Little or no progress had been made on one: an independent and comprehensive review of the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998, the Members’ Integrity Act, 1994 and the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006. |
| Minister’s Zoning Orders (annual report, 2024) | In its 2024 audit of Minister’s Zoning Orders, the Auditor General found that for four (16%) of the 25 orders it sampled, a high-ranking member of the Minister’s Office staff directed Ministry staff to prioritize a request for which this individual had been directly lobbied, with no other documented rationale. The Auditor General concluded: “Actions such as this give the appearance of preferential treatment for some proponents of MZOs over others.” | The Ministry agreed with the recommendations in substance and said it would do more work to decide how to carry them out, citing the zoning-order framework it introduced in April 2024. |
| Skills Development Fund Training Stream (special report, 2025) | In a 2025 special report, the Auditor General found the Ministry’s intake and evaluation processes for the Skills Development Fund Training Stream complied with provincial policy. But 549 (54%) of the applications the Minister’s Office selected for funding were ranked “Poor,” “Low” or “Medium,” and they received about $742 million, or 56% of the funding provided to SDF applicants over the first five rounds, while 670 applications ranked “High” were not selected. The Auditor General concluded the selection process “was therefore not fair, transparent or accountable, and there was little rationale to explain why the high-ranked applicants were not chosen.” The Ministry agreed with all four recommendations. | The Ministry agreed with all four of the Auditor General’s recommendations. |
The Auditor General made recommendations in each report, and the government responded. In the Greenbelt case, it reversed the decision.
One item is still open. The Greenbelt follow-up found little or no progress on an independent and comprehensive review of the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998, the Members’ Integrity Act, 1994 and the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006. The Integrity Commissioner’s own recommendations for the lobbying law are set out in The Volunteer Gap.
Spending is not the same as an answer
The 2026 Ontario Budget sets Ontario Autism Program funding at $965 million for 2026-27. That is real money, and it should be counted. The question is what it buys families: how soon children get services, which services they get, and whether a family can find out where they stand.
Four questions for the Government of Ontario
- Will you state, in writing, that access to a publicly funded service never depends on campaigning, volunteering, donating or supporting any party?
- Who is responsible for telling a family where they stand in the Ontario Autism Program, and how quickly must they answer?
- What safeguards make sure that political connections give no one an advantage in any public-service decision?
- Will you publish how long families wait and what services they receive, and explain decisions against the program’s own rules?
Each one asks for a public rule that any government, of any party, could put in writing.
What you can do
- Email your MPP and ask them the first question on this page. Ask for the answer in writing.
- Read the reports yourself. Every finding above links to the Auditor General’s own document, and the public record page keeps them with other oversight findings.